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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-l and Utah R. App. P. 3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. In this action for medical malpractice, Plaintiff failed to timely 
designate or come forward with a standard of care expert in orthopedic 
surgery to establish the requisite elements of Duty of Care, Breach of Duty 
and Causation against Defendant, Dr. Smith as required by Utah law. 
Plaintiff now appeals the trial Courts granting of Summary Judgment to 
Defendant, Dr. Smith. Plaintiff asserts that he made proper use of a Rule 56(f) 
affidavit as a defense to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and that 
the trial Court improperly dismissed this action. Standard of Review: The 
Appellate Court reviews for abuse of discretion the trial court's ruling on a motion 
for additional discovery before summary judgment per Rule 56(f). Grvnberg v. 
Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, (Utah 2003). 
2. Plaintiff raises an alternative argument based upon the doctrine of 
Res Ipsa Loquitur which argument was not made before the Trial Court and is 
now raised for the first time on appeal. Defendant asserts that the doctrine of 
Res Ipsa Loquitur does not apply to the facts of this case notwithstanding the 
clear precedent that defenses and claims not raised by parties in trial court 
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cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. Standard of Review: As a 
general rule the Supreme Court declines to address issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208, (Utah 2004) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(f) provides: 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions 
to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 
just. 
2. Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
3. Rule 6(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
4. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This medical malpractice action is brought against Scott Smith, M.D. by 
former patient, Robert Troy Jensen. Plaintiff suffers from a long history of Lupus. 
Since 1996 Plaintiff suffered from a large ulcer and wound on his lower left leg 
which was treated with multiple skin grafts by a plastic surgeon which grafts were 
ultimately unsuccessful. In April of 2000, Plaintiffs plastic surgeon recommended 
a below the knee amputation and Plaintiff was referred to Defendant, Dr. Smith, in 
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late April, 2000. On May 3, 2000, Defendant performed a below the knee 
amputation on Plaintiff. Plaintiff sustained wound healing complications including 
infection of his left stump. On June 29, 2001, Defendant performed revision 
surgery to close the wound that failed to heal. Plaintiff ultimately left Defendant's 
care and had an above the knee amputation performed. Plaintiff claims that 
Defendant, Dr. Smith, was negligent in performing the below the knee amputation 
and that an above the knee procedure should have been performed instead. 
B. Course of Proceedings & Disposition Below. 
1. A complaint was filed by Plaintiff in Fifth District Court, Washington 
County on or about December 5, 2003. (R.l-7). 
2. Defendant's answer to Plaintiffs complaint was filed on or about 
January 12, 2004. (R.12-16). 
3. No discovery scheduling conference was held and no stipulated 
discovery plan was prepared or submitted to the Court. Rule 26(f) U.R.C.P. places 
the burden on Plaintiffs counsel to schedule the conference and file the discovery 
plan.(R.133, 135, 136) 
4. On or about April 2, 2004, Defendant served interrogatories and 
written discovery on Plaintiff. (R.17) 
5. Plaintiff served written discovery on Defendants on or about October 
18,2004. (R.26) 
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6. The depositions of Plaintiff, Robert Jensen, and Defendant, Dr. Smith 
were taken on January 11, 2005. (R.21-23, 24-25, 30-31, 32-33) 
7. In a letter dated June 27,2005 to Plaintiffs counsel, counsel for Dr. 
Smith requested deadlines be set for the completion of expert discovery, which 
deadlines were never set. (R.56) 
8. In a letter dated March 21, 2006 to Plaintiffs counsel, counsel for Dr. 
Smith again requested that Plaintiff designate her experts, warning that summary 
judgment would be sought if such designations were not provided within two 
weeks. (R.57) 
9. On March 21, 2006, Defendant filed his Designation of Expert 
Witnesses listing Dr. Robert Rhodes (Plastic Surgeon) as a damage and causation 
expert witness, and Dr. Timothy Beals (Orthopedic Surgeon) as a standard of care 
expert witness. (R.35-44, 53-55). 
10. Counsel for Defendant received no response to their repeated requests 
for expert designation from Plaintiffs counsel and on or about April 21, 2006 
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting expert affidavit 
of Timothy C. Beals, M.D. (R.68-69, 45-67). 
11. Plaintiff requested a two week extension to respond to Defendants 
Motion, which extension was graciously granted by Defendant. (R.125) 
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12. On or about May 22, 2006, Plaintiff filed a "Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment" along with an Affidavit of Matthew T. Graff. 
(R.74-79, 70-73). 
13. On or about May 26, 2006, Defendant filed a "Reply to Plaintiffs 
Motion in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment" (R.90-93). 
14. On or about May 26, 2006, Defendant filed his "Request to Submit 
for Decision" (R.94-95). 
15. On or about June 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed an objection to Defendant's 
Request to submit for decision and requested Oral Argument on the pending 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.96-97, 98-100). 
16. On or about August 4, 2006, Plaintiff filed the Affidavit of Barry E. 
Gustin,M.D. (R.101-105). 
17. Plaintiff filed his Designation of Expert Witnesses on or about August 
11,2006. (R. 106-116). 
18. Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Barry E. Gustin, M.D. 
and Second Request to Submit for Decision with Memorandum in Support were 
filed on or about August 14, 2006. (R.117-118, 119-131). 
19. The Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was signed by Judge Eric A. Ludlow on August 17, 2006 
and was filed on August 21, 2006. (R. 132-140). 
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20. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike on or about August 24, 2006. (R. 141-
147). 
21. On August 29,2006 Judge Ludlow ruled that Defendant's Motion to 
Strike was moot as Summary Judgment had already been granted. (R. 148-149). 
22. Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal on or about September 12, 2006. 
(R. 150-152). 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant, Dr. Smith, asserts that he performed a below the knee amputation 
on Plaintiff on May 3, 2000 (not 2006). Defendant disputes Plaintiffs 
characterization of described "failures" in his surgical technique in performing 
Plaintiffs below the knee amputation. The medical treatment rendered to Plaintiff 
by Dr. Smith has been fully supported as being appropriate and within the standard 
of care by Defendant's orthopedic expert, Timothy C. Beals, M.D. (R.53-55). 
Defendant agrees that Plaintiff sustained wound healing complications including 
infection of his left stump. 
Due to these healing complications, Plaintiff required revision surgery to 
close the wound which surgery was performed on June 29, 2001, by Dr. Smith. 
Plaintiff ultimately left Defendant's care and eventually had an above the knee 
amputation performed by another surgeon. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court properly found that Plaintiff failed to comply with the 
provisions of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and further failed to 
comply with Rule 26's default deadlines for expert witness designation. The Trial 
Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) 
request as no proper motion was before the Court. The Trial Court properly 
ignored Plaintiffs late expert designation and expert affidavit and had discretion to 
do so pursuant to Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, (Utah 1993). 
2. Plaintiff had ample time to retain an expert witness to support his 
claims against Dr. Smith for medical negligence as required by Utah law. The Trial 
Court acted within its discretion and "need not grant Rule 56(f) motions that are 
dilatory or lacking in merit." Crossland Savings v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243, 
(Utah 1994). 
3. Plaintiffs alternative Res Ipsa argument does not apply to the facts of 
this case as this case involves complex medical issues which are outside the 
common knowledge and experience of the layman. Furthermore, Plaintiffs Res 
Ipsa defense should be disregarded by this Court as such defense was not raised by 
Plaintiff to the Trial Court and is now being raised for the first time on appeal. 
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208, (Utah 2004). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
As set forth by the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and Order (R.132-
140), Utah law generally requires the establishment of medical negligence through 
expert testimony. See Dallev v. Utah Valley Reg'l Med. Or.. 791 P.2d 193, 195-96 
(Utah 1990); Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah 
App. 1987). Plaintiff made no argument against this general rule to the Trial Court. 
(R. 134). The Trial Court correctly analyzed the provisions of Rule 26 including the 
purpose of the required attorney's planning meeting and discovery plan and order, 
noting that the rule imposes upon Plaintiffs counsel the obligation to submit same. 
(R. 135-136). The Trial Court found that Plaintiffs expert designations were not 
timely filed pursuant to the default deadlines of Rule 26(f). (R.135, 136, 137) 
The Trial Court noted that Plaintiff did not file a Rule 56(f) motion, instead 
he only cited to Rule 56(f) and requested additional discovery. (R.137). The Trial 
Court reasoned that Rule 56(f) was not the proper provision under which to seek an 
extension of time and noted that such extensions are governed by Rule 6(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R.137). Notwithstanding Plaintiffs failure to file a 
Rule 6(b) motion, the Trial Court held that Plaintiff did not make the showing 
necessary to allow the Court to grant it: 
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The only grounds articulated for the request are the complexity of the 
case and Jensen's counsel's inability to secure an expert within the 
designated time period. Both of these assertions may well be true, but 
Jensen has not alleged any impediment to his ability to request 
additional time to designate expert witnesses prior to the expiration of 
the time allowed under Rule 26. He has therefore failed to establish 
the "excusable neglect" required by Rule 6(b). (R. 138) 
Plaintiff filed their Affidavit of Barry E. Gustin, M.D. (R.127) over two 
months after the Summary Judgment motion had been fully briefed and submitted 
for decision. Plaintiff never formally requested leave of the Trial Court to file 
additional affidavits in opposition to Summary Judgment and the Trial Court 
properly ignored Plaintiffs delinquent affidavit in its ruling on Summary Judgment. 
See Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, (Utah 1993)(Holding that trial courts refusal 
to consider expert affidavit submitted in opposition to motion for summary 
judgment on ground that affiant was not identified as possible witness before 
deadline established in scheduling order, was not abuse of discretion.) 
Defendant, Dr. Smith, on numerous occasions requested that Plaintiff 
designate an expert witness and gave fair warning that the failure to do so would 
result in Defendant's request for summary judgment. (R.56, 57) Plaintiff failed to 
timely designate a medical expert critical of Dr. Smith's care and the Trial Court 
acted within its discretion in granting Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion. 
Wherefore, Defendant, Dr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
Trial Court's ruling and that Summary Judgment be upheld. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 56(f) AFFIDAVIT AND REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL TIME. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(f) provides: 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions 
to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 
just. (Emphasis added) 
Based upon the permissive language of Rule 56(f), it is clearly within the 
Trial Court's discretion to grant or deny a request for a continuance. Plaintiff failed 
to file a formal Rule 56(f) Motion, and merely referred to Rule 56(f) in his 
Memorandum in Opposition and Attorney Affidavit. (R.70-73, 74-79). As pointed 
out by the Trial Court in its Memorandum Decision, Plaintiff did not file a proper 
Rule 56(f) motion. (R.137, footnote 4). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "the trial court need not grant rule 
56(f) motions that are dilatory or lacking in merit." Crossland Savings v. Hatch, 
877 P.2d 1241, 1243, (Utah 1994). The Supreme Court in Crossland reviewed the 
Trial Courts denial of a 56(f) Motion under the abuse of discretion standard and 
held, under the facts of that case, that the trial court "could have reasonably 
concluded that a diligent litigant should have completed the necessary discovery in 
this case within the four-month period." Crossland, 877, P.2d at 1244. 
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In Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Cooperative. Inc.. 48 P.3d 910, 
(Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court thoroughly analyzed Rule 56(f) case law to 
determine under what circumstances such motions should be granted. (See Western 
Dairymen, 48 P.3d at 917-918) The Supreme Court reiterated its position that Rule 
56(f) motions should be granted liberally unless they are deemed dilatory or lacking 
in merit. (See Western Dairymen. 48 P.3d at 917) However, the Court also set forth 
situations in which 56(f) motions were properly denied, including situations where 
a party delayed four months in initiating discovery; and, situations in which 
Plaintiff had "unlimited access" to the information necessary to demonstrate a 
dispute regarding a genuine issue of material fact. (See Western Dairymen, 48 P.3d 
at 917) 
Considering the facts of this case, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) "motion" and request for additional time. Plaintiff 
had ample time to retain an expert witness to support his claims against Dr. Smith 
for medical negligence as required by Utah law. Plaintiff first filed this medical 
malpractice action in December 2003. Plaintiff knew or should have known at that 
time that expert testimony would be required to support his claims for medical 
negligence. Plaintiffs contention that "discovery has not been completed within 
the time allotted by Rule 26 U.R.C.P. because of the complexity of this case" is not 
supported by this case's history. Defendant asserts that the "complexity" of this 
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case was not the reason that discovery has not been completed, but rather it is due to 
Plaintiffs failure to do anything to move this case forward since the depositions of 
the parties were taken in January, 2005. Furthermore, Plaintiff has had unlimited 
access to medical experts for years and still failed to timely designate a standard of 
care expert critical of Defendant, Dr. Smith's care. 
Therefore, under these facts, the Trial Court under its discretion could find 
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) "motion" to be dilatory or lacking in merit. Furthermore, the 
Trial Court also had discretion to disregard Plaintiffs late designation of expert 
witnesses pursuant to the Utah Supreme Courts holding in Arnold v. Curtis, 846 
P.2d 1307, (Utah 1993). 
III. PLAINTIFF'S RES IPSA LOQUITUR ARGUMENT SHOULD BE 
DISREGARDED AS IT WAS NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT NOTWITHSTANDING THE DOCTRINES CLEAR 
INAPPLICABILITY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Plaintiffs alternative argument based upon the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur 
has no application to the facts of this case; but more importantly, such issue was not 
raised before the Trial Court and is now being raised for the first time on appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to consider new defenses, claims, 
or issues that were not raised before the Trial Court which are raised for the first 
time on appeal. See Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, (Utah 1983) (Defenses 
and claims not raised by parties in trial court cannot be considered for first time on 
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appeal); Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208, (Utah 2004) (As a general rule 
the Supreme Court declines to address issues raised for the first time on appeal.); 
Treff v. Hinckley, 26 P.3d 212, 215, (Utah 2001) (The Supreme Court will not 
address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal.) 
Plaintiff raised no Res Ipsa argument in any of his summary judgment 
briefing before the Trial Court. (R.74-79) Wherefore, it would be improper for this 
Court to review that defense which is being raised for the first time on appeal. 
Notwithstanding the above, the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur has no 
application to the facts of this case. As pointed out by the Trial Court, Plaintiff 
does not argue against the general rule that the establishment of medical negligence 
generally requires expert testimony as set forth in Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg'l Med. 
Ctr., 791 P.2d 193, 195-96 (Utah 1990) and Hoopiiania v. Intermountain Health 
Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987). (R.134) 
In his Appellate Brief, Plaintiff cites Pete v. Youngblood, 141 P.3d 629 
(Utah 2006) to support his contention that this case falls within the "common 
knowledge and experience of the layman" exception to the requirement for expert 
testimony in medical malpractice actions. The Youngblood case dealt with a classic 
Res Ipsa fact scenario of a retained sponge following a surgical procedure. In 
Youngblood, this Court discussed other Res Ipsa fact patterns where no medical 
expert testimony was required which include: the loss of a surgical instrument or 
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sponge in the operating site; leaving a needle in a patient; and, a burn from a 
heating pad during surgery. Youngblood. 141 P.3d at 636. 
This case clearly does not fit the Res Ipsa exception and examples as outlined 
by the Court in Youngblood. Supra. Plaintiffs argument that the surgical 
performance of a below the knee amputation is within the "common knowledge and 
experience of the layman" is unfounded. One would certainly hope that the 
technical performance of leg amputations is not within the common knowledge and 
life experience of lay jurors. Plaintiff has attempted to oversimplify the surgical 
procedure by claiming that "too much skin was removed from the leg," which is not 
only misleading, but it fails to consider other factors of medical experience and 
judgment used by Dr. Smith. These factors include the amount of viable tissue that 
Dr. Smith had to work with as well as the appropriate surgical technique based 
upon this patient's presentation. 
Defendant has retained Timothy C. Beals, M.D., as an orthopedic surgery 
standard of care expert. (R.35-44) Dr. Beals is currently the head of the Amputee 
Division of the Orthopedic Department at the University of Utah Medical Center. 
In his affidavit, Dr. Beals renders the opinion that the medical treatment Dr. Smith 
provided to Mr. Jensen was within the standard of care, the decision to perform a 
below the knee amputation was appropriate, and the surgical technique and 
approach used by Dr. Smith was appropriate and within the standard of care. (R.53-
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55) Dr. Beals has also rendered the opinion that Plaintiffs wound healing 
complications are known complications of this type of surgery and were not caused 
by a breach of care or negligence. (R.55) 
Clearly, the medical issues in this case are outside the common knowledge 
and experience of a layman and therefore expert testimony is required and 
Plaintiffs Res Ipsa argument must fail. For these reasons the Court should affirm 
the Trial Court's granting of Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in granting Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff failed to make a proper Rule 56(f) Motion and 
failed to comply with Rule 26 and its default deadlines. The Trial Court exercised 
proper discretion to disregard Plaintiffs delinquent expert affidavit, filed months 
after the Summary Judgment briefing was submitted for decision pursuant to 
Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, (Utah 1993). Accordingly, this Court should 
reject Plaintiffs claim that the Trial Court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs alternative Res Ipsa argument, notwithstanding the 
doctrines clear inapplicability to the facts of this case, should be disregarded by this 
Court as such defense was not raised by Plaintiff to the Trial Court and is now 
being raised for the first time on appeal. The Court should decline to consider 
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Plaintiffs Res Ipsa argument, or alternatively, rule that, even if considered, such 
argument does not apply to this case and would not have changed the outcome of 
the Trial Court's ruling. 
Finally, this Court should hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to grant Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) "motion" and request for 
additional time. 
In short, this Court should affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this // day of January, 2007. 
EPPERSON & RENCHER 
DAVID H. 
DAVID C. EPPERSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/ Appellee 
Scott Smith, M.D. 
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